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Abstract 
 
The  literature  on  the  life and  work  of American  psychiatrist  
Harry Stack Sullivan is used to provide a critique of Jacques 
Derrida’s Archive Fever. Derrida’s  concept  of archival violence 
relies on psychoanalysis both for its epistemology  and for its 
exemplar of archival violence. The Sullivan  literature   shows  how  
these  positions   become  antagonistic when Derrida’s  work  is 
used to think  about  Freud’s critics. The pub- lished literature on 
Sullivan is described as a queer archive that has been strongly  
shaped by historical shifts in discourses about homosexuality, but  
that  continues  to  stimulate  and  frustrate  attempts  to  know  the 
essential truth about Sullivan. Sullivan scholars have been quick to 
read his personality theory  as autobiography, belittling  the 
importance of friendship  in Sullivan’s developmental  theory,  
which  differentiates  it from the heteronormative Oedipal narrative. 
It is argued that Derrida’s mode of critique would entrench rather 
than unearth such hetero- normative    historiographical  moves.   
Scholars   are   invited   to   put Sullivan’s biographies  and 
published  works to a broader  range of uses in the human sciences. 
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As my title suggests, I am, like other historians of the human 
sciences, attempting  to feel my way into the politics of archives. 
For me, as for some of my colleagues, Jacques Derrida’s  (1996) 
Archive  Fever has left a lasting impression  on the way that I 
understand how ‘the archive which produces history is also the 
product of history’ (Joyce, 1999: 36). Since its publication, Archive  
Fever has been invoked  in discussions  of archives as diverse as 
the internet (Caygill, 1999), Nietzsche’s papers (Ernst, 1999), and 
DNA evidence in  the  O.  J. Simpson  trial  (Lynch,  1999). The  
conversation has  gone  far beyond Derrida’s specific critique of the 
history of psychoanalysis. Yet, in reading  what  I will call the 
queer archive of American  psychiatrist  Harry Stack  Sullivan,  I  
have  been  led  to  wonder  whether  the  critical  scope  of Archive 
Fever is limited to the historiography of psychoanalysis in ways that 
neither Derrida nor those who have cited him have acknowledged. 
These psychoanalytic commitments render  Archive  Fever complicit  
with  hetero- normativity and limit its utility for those who would 
democratize  history. 
 
FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING SULLIVAN  
 
Sullivan scholars often describe his memory as lost or forgotten. 
They understand themselves to be laboring less against a 
‘Manichean aboriginal maw of darkness’ – to use Eve Sedgwick’s 
(1990: 8) term – than against an actively constructed ignorance  
about  the man and his work.  For  example, Bartlett Evans (1997) 
argues that Sullivan’s obscurity  is multiply  determined.  First, 
Sullivan’s ideas have become so axiomatic that they are no longer 
attributed to  any  author.  Second,  Sullivan wrote  little  and  
poorly.  Third,  Sullivan’s hostility  to  psychoanalysis ensured  that  
psychoanalysts wanted  to  forget him.  Fourth, Sullivan was 
‘personally  a very  difficult  man,  who  inspired rumors of myriad 
deviancies’ (Evans, 1997: 12). Among these rumors, Evans 
highlights  Sullivan’s schizophrenia and his homosexuality, 
although  others have also noted  his dependence  on alcohol (see 
Allen, 1995: 5; Bever, 1993: 400–1; Perry, 1982: 174–5). 
  
 
Given these overdetermined, and likely willful, ignorances, it 
behooves me to begin by describing some details of this life which 
have not been erased. Harry Stack Sullivan was born  in 1892 the  
only  surviving  child  of Irish- American  farmers  in Chenango  
County in New  York  State. Precociously bright,  Sullivan won  a 
scholarship  in high  school  to  attend  Cornell  Uni- versity, but 
was dismissed in his first year. The exact circumstances and conse- 
quences  of  this  dismissal  remain  debatable.  Sullivan later  
enrolled  in  the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery where 
he had an undistinguished student  career and was awarded  a 
medical degree in 1917. Sullivan worked both  privately and for 
the American military before moving to Washington DC in 1922 
to work at St Elizabeth’s, the national psychiatric hospital. There he 
came under  the influence of William Alanson  White, the mental 
hygienist,  social  reformer,  opponent of  capital  punishment, and  
expert  defense witness in the Leopold  and Loeb murder  trial. 
 
Between 1922 and 1930 Sullivan worked  at Shepperd and Enoch 
Pratt Hospital in Baltimore, accomplishing  the clinical work which 
made him famous.  Sullivan set up  a ward  for  the  treatment of 
young  male schizophrenics   who  were  carefully  selected  from  
the  hospital’s  larger  wards. Medical personnel  were banned  
from the ward, which was staffed only by six other  shy awkward  
young  men. Sullivan theorized  schizophrenia as a form  of 
disordered  social relation  caused by a failure to experience 
certain key developmental  experiences involving what he called 
‘chums’, experiences that the non-hierarchical ward environment 
was supposed  to provide. In articles published  during  the 1920s, 
Sullivan reported  the remarkable  result that  80 per  cent of his 
schizophrenic patients  recovered  under  these  conditions. 
 
In 1927, at the age of 35, Harry Sullivan met a 15-year-old hustler  
called Jimmie Inscoe who became his partner and remained so for 
the rest of Harry’s life.1 Jimmie took  Harry’s  name, becoming  
James Inscoe Sullivan, and was often referred to as Harry’s  son, 
although no formal adoption ever occurred. In  1930 the  Sullivans 
  
moved  to  New  York  where  Harry set up  a private practice and 
Jimmie worked as his secretary. However,  private analysis was a 
difficult  means of making  a living in New  York  after the Stock 
Exchange crash of 1929 (Hale, 1995), and Harry Stack Sullivan 
filed for bankruptcy in 1932. 
 
Sullivan’s interpersonal theories of schizophrenia were informed  not 
only by his clinical work, but also by his social science colleagues, 
particularly  the anthropologist Edward Sapir. In 1933, Sullivan, 
Sapir and others founded the William Alanson White Psychiatric  
Foundation to promote  a new vision of psychiatry that was more 
closely tied to the social sciences and less allied with psychoanalysis.  
The  foundation continues  to  train  analysts  to  this  day.2  
Sullivan  was  one  of  the  original  co-editors   of  the  
foundation’s   journal Psychiatry in 1938. Throughout the 1930s he 
had close friendships  with the psychoanalyst  Clara  Thompson  
(whom   he  sometimes   described   as  his analyst), the design artist 
John Vassos and the author  Ralph Ellison. 
 
In 1939, the Sullivans moved to Baltimore where Sullivan’s work 
was centered  on the Washington  School of Psychiatry.  This 
teaching institution was part of the White Foundation and trained 
psychiatrists  according to an eclectic curriculum that  was less 
dedicated  to psychoanalysis than  its con- temporaries.  Sullivan 
became embroiled  in psychoanalytic turf wars during the 1940s, 
siding first with feminist Karen Horney in her split with the New 
York Psychoanalytic Society in 1941, and later with Erich Fromm 
in his split with Karen Horney’s  Association for the Advancement  
of Psychoanalysis in 1943. As psychiatric  consultant  to the 
Selective Services (1940–1), Sullivan contributed to their ‘Medical 
Circular  no. 1’ which introduced community physicians  to  basic 
psychiatry.  However,  Sullivan withdrew from  service prior  to 
the inclusion  of homosexuality as grounds  for exclusion from  the 
armed  forces. During  and after the war, the Washington  School 
flourished under the auspices of the White Foundation and in 
response to the increased need for trained  military psychiatric  
personnel.  After 1945 Sullivan became involved in the UNESCO 
  
‘Tensions Project’ examining contributions of psychiatry  to world  
peace. He  died in Paris in 1949, en route  to a UNESCO meeting. 
 
ARCHIVE  FEVER  AND  PSYCHOANA LYSIS  
 
Maverick clinician, founder  of a pivotal journal,  shaper of a 
major training institute, and indeed of the boundary between sanity 
and insanity in the mass deployment of psychiatry  during  the 
Second World  War, Sullivan seems an unlikely figure to forget. 
Perhaps Derrida’s Archive Fever provides a starting point to 
analyse why he has been. Derrida  reminds his readers that the 
term ‘archive’ originates  in the earlier arkhe which refers to a 
repository, a legal principle,   and  to  the  location   from   which   
commandments  commence (Derrida,  1996: 1). Indeed,  to  control  
the  archive is to  control  the  future meanings of tradition,  and 
tradition’s  authority. Thus, for Derrida  (1996: 3) ‘there is no 
political power without control  of the archive’ and democracy is 
essentially a question  of access to the archive’s construction, 
organization, and interpretation. Archive  Fever aims to make 
visible the power  exercised by archons that  come to speak for, 
and to limit access to, the authority of archives. 
 
Derrida’s critical impulse finds a target in Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s 
(1991) Freud’s Moses: Judaism  Terminable   and  Interminable 
which  centers  on Freud’s (1939) Moses and Monotheism.  Here,  
Freud  argues that the biblical Moses  was  really  an  Egyptian   
noble  who  was  murdered by  his  Jewish followers  to  whom  he 
had  introduced an Egyptian  monotheistic religion. This murder 
was repressed and covered over by the belief that the Jews them- 
selves are the originators of monotheism. For Freud, this Oedipal 
moment  is fundamental  to contemporary Jewish character,  and it 
explains to him why his  contemporary Jews  have  ‘a particularly   
high  opinion  of  themselves’ (Freud, 1939: 105). 
 
Citing his disciplinary  training as a Jewish historian,  Yerushalmi 
(1991: 8) argues  that  Freud’s  Moses should  be interpreted in 
light  of Freud’s  own Jewish identity.3 Yerushalmi describes Freud 
  
as a ‘psychological Jew’ who has abandoned tradition in favor of 
the empty  category  of Jewish ‘character’. Contra  to Freud’s own 
account,  Yerushalmi argues that Freud’s upbringing was far from  
secularized,  and he uses a Hebrew inscription  in a Bible that 
Jakob Freud returned to his son Sigmund on Sigmund’s 35th 
birthday to prove his case. For Yerushalmi,  anti-Semitic  prejudice  
irks psychological  Jews by recalling  the  degree  to  which  their  
secularized  lives  are  determined by unchosen ancestral events. 
For Freud in particular, the possibility of psycho- analysis being 
labeled a ‘Jewish national affair’ remained ‘an abiding concern and 
source of inner conflict throughout his life’ (Yerushalmi, 1991: 
42). Yerushalmi concludes that Freud’s invocation  of a repressed 
race memory of Moses’s killing resolves this inner conflict by 
allowing the essence of Jewish character to remain interminable, 
even if Judaism itself has no future. 
 
Derrida makes explicit how Yerushalmi’s analytic scheme is 
premised on a negation  of psychoanalysis from  the outset.  For  
Derrida,  the fundamental principle of all archives is to consign, to 
gather together  signs, so that ‘there should  not be any absolute  
dissociation,  any heterogeneity of secret which could  separate  
(secerenere) or  partition,  in an absolute  manner’  (Derrida, 1996: 
3). Throughout Archive Fever, Derrida  repeatedly  emphasizes the 
incongruity between  this  consignation and  Freud’s  concept  of  
the  death drive. Thus any science of the archive must either 
dismiss Freud’s thought and take psychoanalysis as a historical 
object, or acknowledge the challenge posed by the death drive to 
the rationality  of archiving.4  Derrida  favors the latter approach, 
to the point of arguing that the threat of the death drive – in the 
form of radical forgetting – constitutes  the necessary occasion of 
all archiving. 
 
Yerushalmi’s work  is used throughout Archive  Fever to 
demonstrate the limits of ‘proper historiography’ that does not 
attend to this psychoanalytic challenge.  For  Derrida,  Yerushalmi’s  
fifth  chapter,  which  is written  as a ‘monologue with Freud’ and 
addresses Freud’s ghost directly, constitutes  the book’s essence.5 
  
This chapter/monologue obviously  transgresses  the norms of 
historical scholarship,  making visible to Derrida  how Yerushalmi’s 
earlier appeal to those norms forms part of a project to become the 
archon of Freud’s interior  life. Derrida  sees archival violence at 
work  in this monologue on several counts. First, by addressing 
Freud as a fellow Jew, Yerushalmi recalls Freud to a form of 
unchosen  community, offering him shelter only to attack him.6 
Importantly, the archive which warrants this return – the inscription  
in the Bible – is a citation of patriarchal  authority. Second, by 
turning  the dead Freud into the ‘spectral subject’ addressed by this 
monologue, Yerushalmi purports to speak for Freud, and 
particularly  to make Freud’s ghost assent to Yerushalmi’s  thesis  
about  Freud’s  own  identity  crisis.  This  move  is also bound  up 
with  patriarchy.  By constructing Freud  as a patriarch,  and then 
interiorizing his ghost within his monologue,  Yerushalmi repeats 
the primal violence and return  of the repressed described by 
psychoanalysis in general (and Moses and Monotheism  in 
particular). Thus, in refuting Freud’s theory, Yerushalmi’s  book  
enacts  the  psychological   moves  that  it  predicts,  and evidences 
Freud’s enduring  relevance.7 
 
In thinking  through the relevance of this critique to Harry Stack 
Sullivan it  is necessary  to  attend  to  the  double  positioning of  
psychoanalysis in Derrida’s  account  of  archival  violence.  First,  
Derrida’s  attack  on  Freud’s Moses makes Freud  the exemplary  
victim of the archival violence enacted whenever  living historians  
write the lives of dead human  scientists in ways that negate their 
theories. 
 
 To want to speak about  psychoanalysis,  to claim to do the 
 history  of psychoanalysis from a purely  apsychoanalytic 
 point  of view, purified of all psychoanalysis, to the point of 
 believing one could erase the traces of any Freudian  
 impression  is like claiming the right to speak without 
 knowing  what one’s speaking about, without even wanting 
 to hear anything  about  it. This  structure is not  only  valid  
 for the  history  of psychoanalysis, or for any discourse on 
  
 psychoanalysis, it is valid at least for  all the  so-called 
 social or human  sciences. (Derrida,  1996: 54–5; emphasis 
 added) 
 
However,  for Derrida  the Freudian  death drive is also the occasion 
of all archiving, rendering  agreement  with psychoanalytic theories  
of the subject necessary for access to his account  of archival 
violence. These two claims – that the death drive is the necessary 
occasion of archive fever and that Freud is one of many 
intellectuals upon whom archival violence has been enacted – work 
to deepen the reader of Archive Fever’s impression that Freud’s 
Moses is indeed  a violent  text.  Yet,  when  attention shifts  away  
from  Freud,  as Derrida  suggests it might,  and  scholars  have 
often  shown  it to  do  in this journal, these two positions  of 
psychoanalysis create quite different impressions. Any analysis of 
the forgetting of Sullivan’s life would contribute to the history of 
psychoanalysis, but any which presumes Freudian dynamics from 
the outset would enact archival violence, by reifying the theory  
that Sullivan labored  hard to reject. Clearly a theory  of archival 
violence is needed here that does not rely on psychoanalytic 
assumptions. 
 
THE  QUEER ARCHIVE OF  HARRY  STACK 
SULLIVAN  
When I looked to other scholars’ uses of Derrida’s work to think 
through archives  other  than  the  psychoanalytic one,  I  was 
particularly  struck  by feminist work that acknowledged  the 
affective experience of archival scholarship.  When Harriet Bradley 
(1999) narrated  her work  in archives as public  as  a  records  
office  in  Leicester  and  as  intimate  as  her  deceased mother’s 
private effects, she stressed the pleasures, seductions,  and illusions 
of her work. Critiquing Derrida’s psychoanalytic presumptions 
directly, Carolyn  Steedman (1998) noted the dissimilarity  between 
an archive and the unconscious  mind, and reminded  us that 
archival work involves the reading of ‘purloined  letters’, a practice 
that has long been constructed as not only illicit, but also erotic. 
 
  
Lesbian, gay, and queer history provides another starting point for a 
theory of  the  archival  violence  that  structures the  forgetting  of  
Sullivan.  Early pioneers  in  this  field found  the  recovery  of  gay  
and  lesbian  pasts  to  be impeded by the lack of a coherent lesbian 
and gay archive, the deliberate destruction of personal letters, and 
the withholding of access to archives for gay and lesbian scholars 
(e.g. Duberman, 1989; Freedman, 1998; Katz, 1976). Thus, for 
historians,  what Adrienne  Rich (1980) called ‘compulsory hetero- 
sexuality’ is not  only  part  of the history  of sexuality,  but  also 
shapes the histories  of sexuality  that  can be written.  Ann  
Cvetovich  (2002: 110) has recently  argued  that  ‘lesbian and gay 
history  demands  a radical archive of emotion’ to address the 
traumatic loss of these histories. This radical archive is 
paradigmatically  made up of ephemera: ‘the term used by 
archivists and librarians to describe occasional publications  and 
paper documents,  material objects, or items that fall into the 
miscellaneous category  when catalogued’ (Cvetovich,  2002: 111). 
 
Yet  the  traumatic  fragmentation of  lesbian  and  gay  histories  
does  not warrant an essentialist grasping at archives to bring a 
historical figure’s ‘true’ homosexuality to light. Foucault  (1978) 
points  to both  the historical  emergence of the modern  category  
of the homosexual  and the political horizons of desires for truth  
about  sex. Moves to unearth  the historical  truth  about 
homosexuality are not escapes from  power.  Rather,  as Alan 
Stewart (2003) points  out,  ‘we  are  conditioned to  see  in  
privacy  and  secrecy,  what  is withheld,  the signs of the sexual, 
and more specifically, the homosexual’. For Stewart, queer archives 
prime the association between secrecy and homo- sexuality, and 
keep alive the essentialist fantasy of finding that crucial piece of  
solid  evidence  and  identifying  a historical  figure’s  
homosexuality.  Of course, it is precisely this kind of fantasy of 
knowing  the other’s secrets that Yerushalmi’s use of Jakob Freud’s 
letter incites and exploits. Following Steedman (1998) we might ask 
if the emphasis on patriarchal  politics both in Yerushalmi’s and in 
Derrida’s books also has the effect of covering over the erotics of 
men’s knowledge of each other’s private minds. 
 
  
Sullivan’s life certainly incites fantasies of knowing  his secrets, in 
particular because there  is clear evidence of deliberate  
dissembling.  According  to Sullivan scholar  Michael  Allen,  
Jimmy  Inscoe  Sullivan, Sullivan’s partner, may have burned  
Harry’s  private letters after Harry’s  death in 1949. When Jimmie 
died some decades later, 
 
 Friends  of Sullivan’s swooped  down upon Jimmie’s little 
 house in suburban   Rockville,  Maryland,  eager  to  find  
 the  long-fabled  docu- ments. They found, as far as I could 
 ascertain, nothing. (Allen, 1995: 15) 
 
Reading Sullivan’s posthumously edited writings,  and the 
secondary  litera- ture on Sullivan, I recognized in myself and in 
others the repeated asking and frustration of similar essentialist 
impulses. Was Harry Stack Sullivan really gay? How  exactly did 
Jimmie and Harry meet? What really happened  after Harry 
dropped  out from Cornell?  The Sullivan literature  remains a kind 
of queer archive that incites these questions  amongst those few 
historians  who have studied it. However,  I do not want to repeat 
the moves of decrying Sullivan’s repression, or continuing  to 
eagerly swoop down on private houses looking to purloin letters. 
Rather, I want to consider how archive fever would feel if its 
occasion were not the Freudian  death drive, but rather the 
historically specific dynamics of closeting and outing. 
 
THE  WORKS  OF  HARRY  STACK  SULLIVAN  
 
To a large degree, one can periodize  the discussion of 
homosexuality in the literature  on and by Sullivan according  to 
changing opinions  about  homo- sexuality in American psychiatry.  
The postwar  context was a period of exponential growth in 
American psychiatry  (Capshaw, 1999; Herman, 1995), and  one  in 
which  national  security  was increasingly  framed  as a psycho- 
logical battle for hearts and minds (Lutz, 1997; Osgood, 2002). In 
1953, President  Eisenhower  extended military codes used for the 
exclusion of gay men from the armed forces to civilian populations 
(D’Emilio, 1983), and homosexuality was classified as a mental 
  
illness in the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual  
of the American  Psychiatric  Association (Hale, 1995: 200–1). 
 
Gay psychiatrists  were not recognizable  in this context, and 
Sullivan’s life received no sustained biographical attention.  
However,  his psychiatric works began to appear in book form. 
Seven books have been published  under Sullivan’s name, but  only  
one was published  during  his lifetime (Sullivan, 1947). It was 
largely left to Sullivan’s followers in the White Foundation to 
create a public archive of his thought after his death. In the early 
1950s three volumes based on transcriptions of Sullivan’s lectures 
were published in rapid succession (Sullivan, 1953, 1954, 1956). Two 
edited books of Sullivan’s articles were  published  later  by  this  
same committee  (Sullivan, 1962, 1964). The primary  archon in 
the formation of this public archive was Sullivan’s former secretary  
Helen  Swick Perry,  who participated  in the editing of all of these 
books, and wrote introductory commentaries  on all of the articles 
reprinted in the latter two volumes. 
 
The last Sullivan book to be published was the first to be written.  
Sullivan completed Personal Psychopathology (1972) around 1932, 
but decided against publishing   it,  upon  the  advice  of  his  
friends.  Personal Psychopathology presents Sullivan’s first major 
statement  of his personality theory  and draws extensively on his 
clinical work with schizophrenic patients. It was recircu- lated in 
mimeograph form within  the White Foundation in 1965, and when 
it ultimately  appeared as a book, Perry was once again the editor. 
More than any other  of Sullivan’s writings,  it has been 
interpreted as a cipher  of his private  thoughts and of his own  
biographical  history.  However,  Sullivan’s own  sexuality  
remained  unspoken in this  period.  Quite  late on,  scholars could  
describe Sullivan’s theory  of homosexuality without mentioning  
the possibility  of autobiographical relevance at all (e.g. Mullahy, 
1970). 
 
THE  BIOGRAPHIES OF  HARRY  STACK  SULLIVAN  
 
  
Following  gay and lesbian liberation  protest,  the APA  voted  to 
declassify homosexuality as a mental illness in 1973. Lesbians and 
gay men managed to convince psychiatrists  that they were not 
categorically ill, largely by coun- tering psychoanalytic discourse 
with an ‘evidence of experience’ (Scott, 1991) and by claiming to 
be authorities  on their  own  lives (Bayer, 1981). In the decade  
after  the  declassification   of  homosexuality,  Sullivan’s  
experience began to be described  more  thoroughly, and questions  
about  his sexuality were broached. Chapman (1976) was the first to 
publish a claim that Sullivan was homosexual.  His book  on 
Sullivan’s thought opens with a biographical chapter  titled ‘The 
Life and Emotional  Problems  of Harry Stack Sullivan’, which 
problematizes Sullivan’s life most  thoroughly in regard  to 
sexuality. Sullivan was described as ‘acutely aware of the ways in 
which his early emotional  traumas had made him inept in many 
interpersonal areas, and his homosexual  urges jabbed him 
intermittently until his final disease-ridden years’ (Chapman, 1976: 
38). Recalling Yerushalmi’s evocation of Freud’s assenting specter, 
Chapman presents Sullivan as willfully closeted: 
 There were, of course, the added problems of his sexual life. 
 By his own admission, he never achieved a genital 
 heterosexual relationship,  and he felt this was a painful 
 failure. Despite the discretion  he exercised in his 
 homosexual contacts, some of his close friends knew of his 
 sexual difficulties, and in professional circles his 
 homosexuality was generally suspected. Further  discussion 
 of Sullivan’s sexual life would  harm the families of persons 
 recently dead. (Chapman, 1976: 17).   
 
Chapman has never revealed his sources, and his foreclosure of the 
discussion allowed knowledge of Sullivan’s homosexuality, on 
condition that it is inter- preted  as a failure.  Sullivan’s ‘discretion’  
and  experience  of sexual failure assure the reader of Sullivan’s 
assent to Chapman’s homophobia. In a manner familiar to lesbian, 
gay and queer historians, and markedly different from the eager 
swooping  on Jimmie Inscoe Sullivan’s house, Chapman’s  secrecy 
is positioned   as the  opposite  of  violence;  it  limits  harm  to  
  
those  who  are associated with Sullivan’s ‘homosexual contacts’ 
through structures of heterosexual  kinship. 
 
Chatelaine’s  work  (1981) situated  Sullivan with respect to his 
intellectual influences and published elements of a biographical 
study of Sullivan. These include such useful archival materials as 
interviews  with former  Shepperd– Pratt  employees  who  knew  
Sullivan personally.  One  interviewee  describes how  Sullivan was 
known  as ‘Miss Sullivan’ by  his ward’s attendants, and how  
some  hospital  employees  avoided  the  ward  because  of their  
homo- phobia.  Another  described  the majority  of patients  and 
ward attendants  as gay men and Sullivan as gay but ‘under 
control’ (Chatelaine,  1981: 447–55). In spite of these archival 
ephemera, Chatelaine concluded that there is insufficient  evidence  
to  prove  Sullivan’s homosexuality.  The  question  of what  sort of 
evidence would  be needed to prove his heterosexuality is not 
broached. 
 
Finally, Helen Swick Perry (1982) published  Psychiatrist of 
America: The Life of Harry Stack Sullivan. Perry’s is the only 
biography  to claim personal knowledge of Sullivan, and to 
represent  itself as a completed project. Yet the project  was begun  
long  after  Sullivan’s death  and  relies often  on  Perry’s memory  
as a primary  source of data. Since its publication it has become the 
standard   reference  on  Sullivan’s  life,  making  Perry  the  archon  
both   of Sullivan’s theory   and  of  his  private  life. To  date,  no  
other  book-length biography  has appeared. Psychiatrist of America 
implies Sullivan’s homo- sexuality everywhere but never affirms it 
explicitly. For example, Perry describes the American roots of 
Sullivan’s thinking  as follows: 
 
As surely as Walt Whitman’s  Leaves of Grass, or Theodore 
Dreiser’s Sister Carrie,  or  Sherwood   Anderson’s   Winesburg,  
Ohio,  or  Willa Cather’s My Antonia,  Harry Stack Sullivan’s 
interpersonal theory  is an American  product,  raised to the level of 
science and art through the lonely   search  and  brilliant   
  
observation   of  a  boy   growing   up  in Chenango  County at the 
turn of the century.  (Perry, 1982: 9)8 
 
Her most frank statement  on Sullivan’s sexuality remains obscure: 
 
 Over time he achieved his own freedom, however flawed. 
 Friends and colleagues of Sullivan’s by their ‘direct 
 knowledge,’ report  that he had some sexual experiences 
 with women as well as with men. But there is no ready 
 label for how he lived and thought and yearned. (Perry, 
 1982: 334) 
 
Like Chapman,  Perry (1982: 335–8) discusses Sullivan’s sexuality 
as ‘a grave handicap for sexual intimacy with women’, an 
‘inadequacy’, and as his ‘own lot in life’ from which he never 
managed to ‘cure himself’. Like Chapman, she also does not cite 
any sources on these points. She also writes suspiciously little about 
the internal dynamics of Miss Sullivan’s ward and does not even 
refer to the interviews published by Chatelaine. However,  far 
from fixing the truth  of Sullivan’s sexuality, Perry’s archonic 
moves have rendered  her text a queer archive that has incited 
much further  discussion. 
 
HOW HARRY  STACK  SULLIVAN BECAME  G AY 
 
All of the biographies  discussed above were severely limited by 
an inability to think of homosexuality as anything but a personal 
failure, or a poor replica of heterosexuality. In the early 1990s, the 
explosion of work  in lesbian, gay, and queer studies encouraged  
scholars across the humanities  to conceptualize modern lesbian 
and gay subjectivities as important cultural forms in their own 
right, rather than as derivations of – or approximations to – 
heterosexual norms   (e.g.  Butler,   1990;  Duggan,   1992;  
Lauretis,   1991; Miller,  1988; Sedgwick, 1990; Warner, 1993). 
Subsequent essays on Sullivan began to learn from this movement  
and to recognize Sullivan’s homosexuality without pre- suming it to 
be a source of shame or something  that warranted  explanation. 
  
Evincing the kind of essentialist impulse described earlier, Allen 
(1995: 2) set out to ‘prove irrefutably,  that Harry Stack Sullivan 
was gay’. This goal was seemingly achieved by an interview with 
a heterosexual  male trainee of Sullivan who reported having sex 
with Sullivan twice in 1937. However, Allen notes that on his 
discovering this fact, his interest turned to Sullivan’s under- 
standing of his sexuality. He describes Sullivan as a relatively 
self-aware gay man, critiquing  previous  constructions of him as a 
lonely, failing, problem- atic heterosexual. In contrast to past 
authors, Allen emphasizes Harry’s relationship with Jimmie, and 
cites interviews with Perry to support  the view that she 
deliberately  erased significant aspects of Sullivan’s gay life. 
 
A second essay used D. A. Miller’s (1988) concept  of the open  
secret to critique Perry’s treatment of Sullivan’s homosexuality 
(Harnod, 1998). Like Allen, Harnod approached  Sullivan’s 
understanding of his homosexuality as a puzzle,  but  he found  a 
clue in a reading  of Sullivan’s personal symbol. The symbol 
consists of two horses’ heads, one black and one white, in a yin- 
and-yang  pattern.  Harnod reads the symbol  as referencing  a 
Platonic  distinction  between love and lust: 
 
 Sullivan must have been particularly  struck  by Plato’s 
 symbol  for the soul in Phaedrus, the charioteer pulled 
 upward by the horse of spiritual love and downward by 
 the horse of lust. (Harnod, 1998: 314) 
 
For Harnod, Sullivan valorized a kind of Manichean love that 
denied bodily lust and allowed Sullivan to come to terms with 
his homosexuality. Yet this homosexuality continued to exert such 
an influence that Harnod (1998: 317) triumphantly concludes that 
it is ‘the repressed other of interpersonal psychoanalysis’. Once it 
was unspeakable,  later an open secret to be touched on but 
lightly; by the end of the 1990s Harry Stack Sullivan had begun 
to become an openly gay man. 
 
A  SULLIVANIAN  IMPRESSION  
 
  
In spite of their  variability,  all of these accounts  aim to know  
the truth  of Sullivan’s capacity for loving others. Throughout, 
there is a continued appeal to Sullivan’s posthumously published  
works,  presumed  to be riddled  with secret autobiographical 
clues. Positioning  Sullivan as a failing heterosexual, Perry (1982: 
140–1) reads one of his case histories drawn ‘from the group of 
schizophrenics’  (Sullivan, 1947: 100) as an autobiographical 
reference to Sullivan’s own emerging heterosexuality. In contrast,  
Allen (1995: 12) refers to passages in Sullivan’s writings that are 
more tolerant  of homosexuality to develop his narrative of 
Sullivan as an adjusted gay man. 
 
Clearly the range of lives written  from Sullivan’s works is 
diverse indeed. Such uses of these works can have the effect of 
making Sullivan assent to each biographer’s  speculation.  As 
Derrida  might have it, they animate Sullivan’s ghost to make it 
assent with their own narrative. In so doing, they cover over the 
historically specific norms which warrant and constrain the 
writing of Sullivan’s sexual history.  Discourse  which  ontologizes  
the homosexual  is a move within,  not outside,  modern  power  
(Foucault,  1978). Allen (1995: 7) argues that Sullivan’s early 
adulthood was organized  by ‘the all consuming drama  of  
coming  out’.  But  the  shifting  terrain   of  sexual  categories  in 
Sullivan’s time negates the singularity  to  ‘coming out’ that  
Allen assumes (Chauncey, 1994). The homo/hetero axis is but one 
of many axes of sexual difference (Sedgwick, 1990), and gay men 
are far from the most marginal of sexual people (Rubin, 1983). In 
particular  Sullivan scholars continue  to read secrecy as evidence 
of homosexuality. Why assume, as Harnod (1998) does, that 
Sullivan’s horse’s-head symbol is a public reference to his 
homosexuality, and  not  a more  literal  reference  to  bestiality?  
Applying  the  problematic strategy  of reading  Sullivan’s work  
as autobiography, no  end  of evidence could be found to support  
this conclusion. Consider  Sullivan’s references to sexual dreams 
about horses (Sullivan, 1972: 298) or ‘my pleasure in horseback 
riding’ (Sullivan, 1947: 27).9 
 
  
Does it make sense to follow Derrida  and to think  of the 
discovery  of a gay-affirmative Sullivan in the 1990s as a kind of 
return  of Sullivan to a form of unwanted community? This form of 
archival violence is repeatedly played out in Sullivan biographies.  
I have described  elsewhere how Sullivan’s Irish Catholic 
background provides Perry with an increasingly tortured schema to 
explain Sullivan’s lack of heterosexual interest, his intimate 
relationships with men,  his  financial  extravagance  and  his  
alcoholism.   Perry’s  account   of Sullivan’s difference from 
heterosexual  norms  of American  WASPs returns Sullivan to the 
Catholic Church, an institution that he often critiqued and in 
which  he did not  participate  as an adult  (Hegarty,  2004). 
Harnod returns Sullivan to an unchosen  community that turns  us 
back to the problematics of Derrida’s  double  debt  to 
psychoanalysis in Archive  Fever. Writing  in a psychoanalytic 
journal, Harnod describes Sullivan’s theory  as ‘psycho- analysis’ 
rather than ‘psychiatry’; a distinction  that Sullivan labored hard 
to create. For  Harnod, Sullivan’s homosexuality is not  simply  
forgotten, but repressed. Harnod reminds  us that  D. A. Miller’s 
‘open secret’ takes as its foundational exemplar  the Freudian  
hysteric.  The Freudian  impression  on Harnod’s  account of 
Sullivan, and the consequent violence to Sullivan’s own thought,  
point to the limits of grounding  the category of archival violence 
in Freudian  terms. Indeed, Harnod’s  text speaks to our chronic 
overfamiliarity with psychoanalysis,  a Freudian  impression on all 
of us, without which Derrida’s text would be utterly  unintelligible. 
 
No  such  familiarity  can be claimed  for  Sullivan. Rather,  the  
persistent search for the truth of Sullivan’s personality in his works 
proceeds in concert with a refusal to listen to what Sullivan might 
have said about the possibility of such knowing.  Sullivan’s 
writings  center  human  personality on ‘the self system’,  which  is 
formed  from  significant  relationships with  others  and which 
forms the basis of feelings of well-being (e.g. Sullivan, 1954: 96, 
130). In this corpus  of work, human being is necessarily 
interpersonal. This leads to a critique of the idea of unique 
personality: 
 
  
 I  have  inveighed  against  ‘the  delusion  of  unique  
 individuality’  and referred to personality as the 
 hypothetical entity which we posit to account  for  
 interpersonal relations.  I do  not  believe that  this  
 denies anyone  ‘A personality’;  it serves its purpose  if  it 
warns anyone  that I never expect to know  all about   his 
personality – and am as certain as can  be  that  he   too  will  
always  share  my  ignorance  in  this  regard.  (Sullivan, 1947: 
xi) 
 
Interior  Freudian  instincts, including  the death drive, are 
described  as convenient theoretical  fictions in Sullivan’s works.  
This of course suggests that all attempts  to use notions  of 
interior  personality dynamics  as explanatory constructs  do 
violence to Sullivan’s memory.  Yet the ubiquity  of such 
statements has not slowed the impulse to treat Sullivan’s 
personality as a puzzle to be deciphered, or those same works as 
the cipher. Ironically, the historians who have written  about 
Sullivan have presumed to know more about minds from words 
than Sullivan often did in regard to his own psychiatric patients. 
The variability in the accounts of Sullivan’s life evidences an 
enduring Sullivanian impression.  As Sullivan appears to have 
believed, it is no trivial matter to know the mind of another  
through his or her words. 
 
HARRY  STACK  SULLIVAN  AND  HIS  CHUMS  
 
When a theory  of the human  subject is read as a form of 
autobiography, it becomes ideographic  rather than nomothetic. 
Whatever the theory’s historical interest, its enduring epistemic 
value for the human sciences is diminished. The tethering  of 
Sullivan’s work  to his life accomplishes this effect also. As my 
impulse is to animate a wider  range of interest  in Sullivan, it is 
worth looking  to his theory  to see where it has been most 
forcefully  rewritten  as autobiography, and what might be learned 
by rethinking  it once again as a general  theory  of  the  human  
subject.  Sullivan  certainly  does  not  always sustain the anti-
individualist impulse implied by his critique of unique 
  
personality.  Like Freud,  Sullivan describes a singular, and highly 
androcentric, developmental   norm  for  the  growing  human.  
Just  as narrative  has  been central  to  the  professionalization  of  
history   (White,  1987),  theories   of normative  developmental  
stages have been  key  in the  origins  of develop- mental 
psychology  as a way of understanding the modern  subject 
(Burman, 1994). Sullivan’s thought is no different. 
 
Sullivan’s developmental  theory  contains  the usual complement  
of oral, anal, and genital theories. However,  unlike Freud’s 
narrative, Sullivan locates the development of affective life outside 
the heterosexual  nuclear family. Sullivan  describes  how  children   
form  ‘chumships’  with  same-sex  peers towards  the end of pre-
adolescence,  and these relationships signal the end of childhood  
egocentricity and provide the first experiences of love. Eventually 
these  chumships  give way  to  same-sex  adolescent  gangs, a 
shift  which  is roughly  co-terminous with the onset of puberty. 
Sullivan (1947: 41) writes glowingly  of these chumships,  they  
represent  ‘the quiet miracle of adolescence’ and are necessarily 
homosexual,  as they require feelings of similarity. Thus, ‘the boy 
finds a chum who is a boy, the girl finds a chum who is a girl’ 
(Sullivan,  1947:  43).  While  homosexual   sex  can  occur  
between   chums, Sullivan describes this as more likely to lead 
towards  adult heterosexuality than adult homosexuality (Sullivan, 
1953: 256–7). Failure to achieve such chumships can lead to 
disaster, and it is not uncommon for them to represent 
 
 ‘the  best  grasp  on  the  problems  of  life that  some  
 people  ever  manifest’ (Sullivan, 1954: 137). It is these 
 chumships  which  Sullivan understood his 
 schizophrenic patients at Shepperd–Pratt to have missed, 
 and which he hoped their experience on Miss Sullivan’s 
 ward might provide.  
 
The posthumous discovery  of Sullivan’s close pre-adolescent 
friendship with  Clarence  Bellinger (also later a psychiatrist)  has 
made chumship  the focal point for the application  of Sullivan’s 
theory  to understanding his life. Several biographers  have focused 
  
on Sullivan’s friendship  with Bellinger (Chapman, 1976: 22–3; 
Perry,  1982: 90–2; Harnod, 1998: 311–12), and tend to assume that 
this was the prototypical chumship. Once Sullivan’s theory of 
chums  has  been  deciphered  as a secret  autobiographical 
reference  to  his relationship  with Bellinger, Sullivan’s 
developmental  narrative returns  to the dynamics  of the 
heterosexual  nuclear family, where Freud’s is also centred. The 
child’s relations outside the nuclear family become peripheral once 
again. Archive Fever might lead away from a consideration of 
such historiographical politics. To the extent  that  Derrida  
valorizes  the endurance  of Oedipal narratives, his work remains 
within the play of heterosexual kinship relations, and erases the 
possibility  that children’s most intimate and formative 
experiences of love are often not with their kin. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Thus while there has been a Derridian impression on my thinking  
about Sullivan, Sullivan’s work  leads me to conclude that Archive 
Fever frustrates Derrida’s  own  project  to open  up the archive to 
multiple  uses much  more than Derrida,  among others, has 
acknowledged. The category of archival violence that Derrida  
presents is limited by its Freudian  impression, an impression that 
has been made on all of us. Centering the category of archival 
violence on Sullivan, a deliberately forgotten  figure, queries 
attempts both to silence and to stabilize Sullivan’s complicated  
theory  of human relationality, particularly  those  aspects of it 
that  invoke  determinants from  outside  the heterosexual  nuclear 
family. 
 
What  kinds  of  questions   might  democratize   the  Sullivan  
archive  and broaden engagement with it? I shall conclude with 
some possible future directions.  First,  and  most  obviously,  
Sullivan’s chums  are a rare  attempt within  psychology  to  
prioritize  children’s  friendships  as something  other than  a 
developmental  precursor to subsequent adult  relationality.  To 
what extent  is their  dismissal part  of a larger pattern  of 
prioritizing adults  over children, or familial over non-familial  
  
relationships,  as determinants of personality?  Second, queer  
kinship  also figures heavily in anthropologists’ post-Schneiderian 
debates about the constructedness of American kinship (Schneider, 
1980; Hayden, 1995; Weston,  1991). This conversation often points 
to the newness of queer families, but nowhere takes account of the 
Sullivans, who used the cultural logic of ‘father’ and ‘son’ to 
describe them- selves and moved through the culture and 
personality network  of American anthropologists  in  1930s  New   
York.   Third,   Sullivan  theorized   homo- sexuality and 
schizophrenia as effects of alienation, prefiguring  the work  of 
Gregory   Bateson,  Gilles  Deleuze,  Michel  Foucault,  Guy  
Hocquenghem, and R. D. Laing. How  does our reduction of his 
history  to autobiography obscure  his contribution to a history  of 
alienation  and alterity?  Derrida  is right  that  archives  act  on  
us,  and  that  tradition can  appear  to  provide shelter that 
becomes attack. But Derrida  also fails to make visible how the 
heterosexual  family constitutes  such a false form of shelter, or 
to allow for the  productive   forms  of  relationality   that  
Sullivan  theorized   beyond   its boundaries. 
 
NOTES  
 
1. Perry (1982: 9) writes that ‘there is some mystery about the way 
in which Sullivan met Jimmie’ but it appears to be a mystery  of 
her own making. Sullivan refers to Jimmie as a ‘former patient’, 
and Perry reports  that one of Sullivan’s colleagues had seen 
Jimmie standing in the street for several nights ‘in some kind of 
catatonic pose’. Allen (1995: 9) has subsequently reported  that 
Perry told him that Jimmie had been working  as a hustler prior 
to moving in with Harry Stack Sullivan. 
2. See www.wawhite.org/home/home.htm 
3. Yerushalmi  (1991: xv–xvi) describes  himself as ‘a historian  
who  has generally been known  as a student  of Sephardic 
Jewry’ and notes that ‘it occurred  to me that it was precisely 
my training  as a Jewish historian  that might enable me to 
understand this book [Moses and Monotheism]  in ways not 
accessible to psycho- analysts or literary critics’. 
4. Derrida  (1996: 34) writes: ‘Let us imagine in effect a project of 
  
general archivio- logy. . . . Such a discipline must  in effect risk 
being paralysed  in a preliminary aporia.  It  would  have either  
(1) to  include  psychoanalysis . . . or (2) on  the contrary,  to  
place itself under  the  critical authority (in the  Kantian  sense) 
of psychoanalysis.’ 
5. Derrida  (1996: 40) writes: ‘Thus one can say just as well that 
the entire book is in advance  contained,  as if carried  away,  
drawn  in, engulfed  by  the  abysmal element of the 
“Monologue” for which it constitutes  a kind of long preface, 
an exergue, a preamble,  or a foreword. The true title of the 
book,  its most appro- priate title, its truth,  would indeed be 
Monologue with Freud.’ 
6. Yerushalmi  (1991: 81) writes: ‘But it is a monologue addressed  
directly to you. 
 In what is at issue here, indeed has been so all along,  we 
both  have, as Jews, an equal stake. Therefore  in  speaking of the 
Jews I shall not say “they.”  I shall say  “we.” The distinction  is 
familiar to you.’ Derrida  (1996: 41) comments  that now in 
death, as at his  circumcision,  Freud  is forced to enter this 
community  not of his choosing. ‘He cannot refuse this 
community  at once proposed  and imposed. He can only say 
“yes”  to this covenant into which he must enter one more 
 time’ (emphasis in original). 
7. Derrida  (1996: 61) describes  Yerushalmi  as ‘[m]imicking  a 
doubly  fictitious paricide,  he  argues  bitterly   with  a  master  
whose  psychoanalytic  rules  and premises he accepts’. 
8. Aside  from  Whitman’s  and  Cather’s  sexualities,  Dreiser’s  
Sister  Carrie  was banned  upon  publication for its 
sensationalism  while Anderson’s  collection  of short stories 
opens with ‘Hands’, an account of a gay schoolteacher  whose 
life is ruined by scandal in small-town America. 
9. Even Kinsey, Pomeroy  and Martin (1948: 671) would support  
such a hypothesis. These researchers found  that ‘26 to 28 per 
cent of the rural males of the college level have some animal 
experience to the point of orgasm’. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
  
Allen, M. (1995) ‘Sullivan’s Closet: a Reappraisal  of Harry Stack 
Sullivan’s Life and His  Pioneering  Role  in American  
Psychiatry’,  Journal of Homosexuality 29: 1–18. 
 
Bayer, R. (1981) Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The 
Politics of Diagnosis. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Berube, A. (1990) Coming  out under Fire: The History  of Gay 
Men and Women in World War Two. New York: Macmillan. 
 
Bever C. T. (1993) ‘Collaboration and Conflict:  Ernest  E. Hadley  
and Harry  Stack Sullivan, 1930–1945’, Journal of the  American  
Academy  of Psychoanalysis 21: 387–404. 
 
Bradley, H. (1999) ‘The Seductions of the Archive: Voices Lost 
and Found’, History of the Human Sciences 12: 107–22. 
 
Burman, E. (1994) Deconstructing Developmental Psychology. 
London:  Routledge. Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. 
 
Capshaw,  J. H. (1999) Psychologists on the March: Science, 
Practice and Professional Identity in America, 1929–1969. 
Cambridge:  Cambridge University  Press.  
 
Caygill,  H.  (1999) ‘Meno  and  the  Internet:  Between  Memory  
and  the  Archive’, History of the Human Sciences 12: 1–11. 
 
Chapman,  A. H. (1976) Harry  Stack Sullivan: The Man and His 
Work.  New  York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 
 
Chatelaine,  K. (1981) Harry Stack Sullivan: The Formative  
Years. Washington,  DC: University  Press of America. 
 
Chauncey,  G. (1994) Gay New  York: Gender, Urban Culture, and 
the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940. New York: Basic 
Books. 
  
 
Cvetovich,  A.  (2002) ‘In  the  Archives  of  Lesbian  Feeling’,  
Camera  Obscura  17: 107–47. 
 
D’Emilio,  J. (1983) Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The  
Making  of a Homo- sexual Minority  in the United  States. 
Chicago, IL: University  of Chicago Press.  
 
Derrida,  J. (1996) Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. 
Chicago, IL: University  of Chicago Press. 
 
Duberman,  M.  (1989)  ‘ “Writhing   Bedfellows”   in  Antebellum 
South   Carolina: Historical  Interpretation  and  the  Politics   of  
Evidence’,  in  M.  Duberman, M. Vicinus and G. Chauncey  
(eds) Hidden  from  History: Reclaiming  the Gay and Lesbian 
Past. New York: Meridian, pp. 153–68. 
 
Duggan, L. (1992) ‘Making it Perfectly Queer’, Socialist Review 
22: 11–31. 
 
Ernst, W. (1999) ‘Archival Action: The Archive as ROM  and Its 
Political Instrumentalization  under National Socialism’, History of 
the Human Sciences 12: 13–34. 
 
Evans, F. B. (1997) Harry  Stack Sullivan: Interpersonal  Theory  
and Psychotherapy. London:  Routledge. 
 
Foucault,  M. (1978) The  History  of Sexuality,  Vol. 1, An  
Introduction. New  York: Random  House. 
 
Freedman,  E. (1998) ‘ “The  Burning  of Letters  Continues”: 
Elusive Identities  and the  Historical  Construction  of  Sexuality’,  
Journal  of  Women’s   History   9: 181–200. 
 
Freud,  S. (1964[1939]) ‘Moses and Monotheism’,  in The 
Standard Edition  of the Complete  Psychological Works of 
Sigmund  Freud, Vol. XXIII,  ed. and trans. J. Strachey. London:  
  
The Hogarth Press, pp. 7–137. 
 
Hale, N. (1995) The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the 
United States: Freud and the Americans, 1917–1985. New York: 
Oxford University  Press. 
 
Harnod, J. (1998) ‘Harry  Stack  Sullivan  and  the  Gay  
Psychoanalysis’,  American Imago 55: 299–317. 
 
Hayden, C. P. (1995) ‘Gender,  Genetics  and Generation: 
Reformulating Biology in Lesbian Kinship’, Cultural  
Anthropology  10: 41–63. 
 
Hegarty,  P. (2004) ‘Was He Queer  . . . or Just Irish? Reading the 
Life of Harry Stack Sullivan’, Lesbian and Gay Psychology Review 
5: 103–8. 
 
Herman, E. (1995) The Romance of American Psychology: Political 
Culture in the Age of Experts. Berkeley: University  of California  
Press. 
 
Joyce, P. (1999) ‘The Politics of the Liberal Archive’, History of 
the Human Sciences, 12: 35–49. 
 
Katz,  J. (1976) Gay  American  History: Lesbians and Gay  Men  
in the U.S.A.  New York: Avon Books. 
 
Kinsey, A. C., Pomeroy, W. B. and Martin, C. E. (1948) Sexual 
Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia, PA: W. B. Saunders. 
 
Lauretis,  T. de (1991) ‘Queer  Theory,  Lesbian  and Gay  
Studies: an Introduction’, differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural  Studies 3(2): iii–xviii. 
 
Lutz,  C.  (1997) ‘The Psychological  Ethic  and  the  Spirit  of 
Containment’,  Public Culture  9: 135–59. 
 
Lynch,  M. (1999) ‘Archives in Formation: Privileged Spaces, 
  
Popular  Archives and Paper Trails’, History of the Human 
Sciences 12: 65–87. 
 
Miller, D. A. (1988) The Novel and the Police. Berkeley, CA: 
University  of California Press. 
 
Mullahy,  P. (1970) The  Beginnings  of Modern  American  
Psychiatry: The  Ideas  of Harry Stack Sullivan. Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Osgood, K. A. (2002) ‘Hearts and Minds: the Unconventional Cold 
War’, Journal of Cold War Studies 4: 85–107. 
 
Perry,  H.  S. (1982)  Psychiatrist  of  America:  The  Life  of  
Harry  Stack  Sullivan.  Cambridge,  MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard  University  Press. 
 
Rich, A. (1980) ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence’, Signs: Journal of Women  in Culture  and Society 5: 
631–60. 
 
Rubin,  G.  (1983) ‘Thinking  Sex: Notes   for  a Radical  Theory   
of  the  Politics  of Sexuality’, in C. S. Vance (ed.) Pleasure and 
Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality. Boston, MA: Routledge  & 
Kegan Paul, pp. 157–210. 
 
Schneider, D. M. (1980) American Kinship: A Cultural Account, 
2nd edn. Chicago, IL: University  of Chicago Press. 
 
Scott, J. W. (1991) ‘The Evidence of Experience’, Critical Inquiry  
17: 773–97.  
 
Sedgwick,  E.  (1990)  The   Epistemology   of  the  Closet.  
Berkeley:  University   of California  Press. 
 
Steedman, C. (1998) ‘The Space of Memory:  In an Archive’, 
History  of the Human Sciences 11: 65–83. 
 
  
Stewart, A. (2003) ‘Homosexuals  in History: A.L. Rowse and the 
Queer Archive’, in K.  O’Donnell and  M.  O’Rourke (eds)  Love,  
Sex,  Intimacy and  Friendship between  Men, 1550–1800. 
Basingstoke, Hants:  Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 53–69. 
 
Sullivan, H. S. (1947) Conceptions of Modern  Psychiatry. 
Washington,  DC:  William Alanson White Psychiatric 
Foundation. 
 
Sullivan, H.  S. (1953) The  Interpersonal  Theory  of Psychiatry.  
New  York:  W. W. Norton. 
 
Sullivan, H. S. (1954) The Psychiatric Interview. New York: W. 
W. Norton.   
 
Sullivan, H. S. (1956) Clinical Studies in Psychiatry. New York: 
W. W. Norton.  
 
Sullivan, H. S. (1962) Schizophrenia as a Human Process. New 
York: W. W. Norton.  
 
Sullivan, H. S. (1964) The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social 
Science. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Sullivan, H.  S. (1972) Personal Psychopathology: Early 
Formulations.  New  York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Warner,  M., ed. (1993) Fear of a Queer  Planet: Queer  Politics 
and  Social Theory.  Minneapolis: University  of Minnesota  Press. 
 
Weston, K. (1991) Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship. 
New York: Columbia University  Press. 
 
White, H. (1987) The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and 
Historical Representation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University  Press. 
 
  
Yerushalmi, Y. H. (1991) Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable  and 
Interminable. New Haven, CT: Yale University  Press. 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  
 
PETER  HEGARTY is a social psychologist and a historian  of 
psychology  who teaches at the University  of Surrey. His past 
historical work  has focused on psychological   technologies   
aimed  at  detecting  sexual  orientation.  He  is currently  working 
on a manuscript about sexual politics in research on intel- lectual 
giftedness. 
 
Address: Department of Psychology,  School of Human  Sciences, 
University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK. Tel: 01483 
686898. [email: P.Hegarty@surrey.ac.uk] 
